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I. THE CRUSADE DOWN THE PATH OF GENUINE JUSTICE
Many fraudulent conveyances emerge from the
catastrophes that cause great financial and sometimes
personal losses. Two antagonistic parties emerge from the
debris of civil litigation. The first is the defendant who has
defaulted on an obligation, or worse, committed some
grievous wrong, including a sexual assault, maiming of a
person, brazen theft, infringement, swindle or cheat. The
second is the plaintiff who won a big-dollar judgment, but
finds that the defendant, now called a debtor, is
unresponsive, unwilling, or unable to pay the civil
In other cases, a financial catastrophe
judgment. 1
produces legions of victims who have suffered at the
hands of a Ponzi operator or peddler of defective products
on a wide scale. 2 Other victims include victims of
Homeowner's insurance typically provides the cost of defense,
but not the indemnity. "Even conduct that is traditionally
classified as ‘intentional’ or ‘wilful’ has been held to fall within
indemnification coverage." Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168,
177 (Cal. 1966).
2 See Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (2016),
which held that fraudulent conveyance (siphoning off corporate
assets) is fraud and nondischargeable under Bankruptcy Code
Section 523(a)(2) (fraud). Fraudulent conveyances typically
1
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investment schemes, real estate frauds, stock follies, and
pyramid schemes, among other large-scale wrongs. 3
While the misery level might ascend or descend for each
victim, the end result is the same in each case. The debtor
owes a large sum of money, including punitive damages,
arising from an egregious wrong and refuses to
compensate the victims that are cast as the creditors in an
ensuing fraudulent conveyance action. 4
These creditors seek payment of their judgments.
Payment is more than just recompense for personal and
financial losses that might include the loss of a
breadwinner, loss of life savings, enormous financial
damage or harm, damage to property, or the inability to
engage in meaningful employment. Payment restores the
personal dignity and self-esteem suffered by the victim at
the hands of malevolent individuals who committed the
wrong for their own self-aggrandizement, greed, or malice.
Getting paid is more than getting even. Getting paid is
getting back a life, and no less.
The quest to seek compensation as restorative of
personal esteem is the starter's pistol down this marathon.
Astute to the personal anger and unrequited rage of the
victim who is now a creditor under fraudulent conveyance
involve “a transfer to a close relative, a secret transfer, a transfer
of title without transfer of possession, or grossly inadequate
consideration.”
3 "What are the obligations of class counsel when he learns that
the defendant in the class action he is prosecuting has ceased
operations, sold its assets to a third party, and intends to file for
bankruptcy?" Barboza v. W. Coast Digital GSM, Inc., 102 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 295, 296 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
4 See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439 et seq. Civil Code Section 3439.01(b)
(stating claim includes tort claim, without regard to being
reduced to a judgment). FRCP 69 compels the court to follow the
state law remedies of the domicile state where the court sits, save
discovery. The substantive body of fraudulent conveyance law
is state law. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Interest
accrues at the federal (.6%), not state rate (10% plus). See also,
Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.05 (West) (discussing balance sheet
fraudulent conveyance) or Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04 (West)
(discussing conveyance with the intent to hinder, delay or
defraud, and other claims).
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laws, the debtor commences his or her (or its) campaign of
asset protection to shield any assets from civil enforcement
under the judgment. 5 To avoid any doubt, a fraudulent
conveyance is a fraud upon the creditor, even without the
necessary representation. 6 Asset protection means that the
debtor either: changes the form or names on the title; or
hides, conceals, transfers, buries, or reconfigures assets. 7
Asset protection cloaks the assets with a veil that conceals
the asset from discovery and hides the assets from plain
sight. 8 Even if the assets are discovered, lifting the veil to
reach the assets compels the creditor to spend real money
to seize the debtor's assets through legal process. 9 At some
point, the financial toll to reach these assets becomes
intolerable, which forces the creditor to abandon the
quest. 10 All parties are sensitive to the fact that the creditor
"A. cannot lay a trap for B., secure his confidence, induce him
to make a conveyance of his property in the expectation that it
will be returned, and thereafter retain the fruits of his perfidy on
the ground that B. too readily yielded to temptation to save
himself at the possible expense of creditors." Chamberlain v.
Chamberlain, 95 P. 659, 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908).
6 "The degree to which this statute remains embedded in laws
related to fraud today clarifies that the common-law term
“actual fraud” is broad enough to incorporate a fraudulent
conveyance." Husky, 136 S.Ct. at 1587.
7 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc.
527 U.S. 308, 338–39 (1999) (stating "Moreover, increasingly
sophisticated foreign-haven judgment proofing strategies,
coupled with technology that permits the nearly instantaneous
transfer of assets abroad, suggests that defendants may succeed
in avoiding meritorious claims in ways unimaginable before the
merger of law and equity").
8 "It is in the acts of concealment and hindrance." Husky, 136 S.
Ct. at 1587.
9 The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act succeeded the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, which is successor to the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Courts still apply the UFCA. " . .
.UFTA [history] . . . makes clear its remedies are cumulative to
pre-existing remedies for fraudulent conveyances." Cortez v.
Vogt, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
10 "Appellants correctly state that the UFTA does not itself
authorize a fee award . . ." Cardinale v. Miller, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d
546, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). However, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
5
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will expend enormous sums to unwind the debtor's
fraudulent conveyance. The ultimate barrier that shields
the debtor's assets is the financial burden incurred by the
creditor in dismantling the veil to reach the assets. Every
dollar that the debtor spends in lifting the veil of asset
protection is an additional expense that deters the creditor
from reaching the asset. Making the creditor spend money
is the debtor’s goal. The more that is spent, the closer the
debtor comes to shielding all assets, assuming that
sometime in the future the creditor will run out of money
and quit. In addition, many debtors perceive that the trial
courts and appellate courts treated them unfairly in the
original proceedings. The debtor seeks to nullify this
"unjust result" through asset protection by rendering the
judgment uncollectible. Asset protection litigation is the
continuation of the prior litigation by other means. 11
The battle to recover attorney's fees incurred by a
creditor in a fraudulent conveyance action or enforcement
takes center stage. 12 Under Cardinale v. Miller, the creditor
would not collect fees in the fraudulent conveyance action
per se, but the creditor could recover fees against the debtor
(or third party) in the original action, assuming that the
judgment itself provides for an award of attorney's fees. 13
In response, the debtor will necessarily engage in various
machinations to prevent the creditor from recovering fees
based on the fraudulent conveyance litigation by a timely
and precipitous cash payment of the underlying
judgment. 14
Section 685.040 imposes fees arising from the fraudulent
conveyance actions upon the judgment debtor.
11 "War is the continuation of politics by other means." Carl von
Clausewitz. Clausewitz: War on Politics by Other Means, ONLINE
LIBRARY OF LIBERTY: A COLLECTION OF SCHOLARLY WORKS ABOUT
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND FREE MARKETS (Apr. 13, 2016),
http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/clausewitz-war-as-politics-byother-means.
12 See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.07(a) (avoid the conveyance), (b)
(attachment of asset), (c) (execute on fraudulently conveyed
asset).
13 Cardinale, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 550.
14 See In re Conservatorship of McQueen, 328 P.3d 46, 55 (Cal.
2014). (holding that by timely payment before filing of cost bill
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Here are few example of how asset protection
accrues an expense that deters enforcement:
1. Facing civil claims arising from sexual assault
charges, the perpetrator transferred his home to third
parties. In ensuing civil litigation, the victim sought, and
was granted, an injunction against the further transfer of
the property. 15
2. In the face of a $78,000,000 liability, the
corporate defendant deeded property to the insiders and
related parties. The creditor proceeded to attach the
property, but the third parties (the conveyees and
company insiders) filed a third party claim that the court
denied. The appellate court reversed based on the trial
court's error in failing to compel the creditor to prove a
fraudulent conveyance. 16
3. Husband, a doctor, engaged in an extra-marital
affair that produced a daughter. The wife filed for a
divorce that culminates in a marital settlement agreement
that rendered the husband impecunious. The paramour
filed suit to vacate the MSA that landed in the California
Supreme Court. 17

or fee motion, debtor avoided liability for post-judgment fees
arising from fraudulent actions).
15 "The timing of defendant's conveyance of his personal
residence to a trust after he was arrested on charges of
molestation may be indicative of an intent to protect his assets
against creditors." Oiye v. Fox, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 84 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2012).
16 "A creditor wishing to pursue a fraudulent transfer theory
may not escape the burden of proving its claim merely because
the contest is played out in a third party claim proceeding."
Whitehouse v. Six Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 604 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
17 "They entered into an M.S.A. under which Husband conveyed
all his interest in the couple's real estate to Wife, and she
conveyed her interest in Husband's medical practice to him. The
M.S.A. provided that Husband would be solely responsible for
his extramarital child support obligation . . . By June 1997,
Husband had abandoned his medical practice. He now lives
with his mother. He has no assets and little income." Mejia v.
Reed, 74 P.3d 166, 168 (Cal. 2003).
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The simple fact-pattern in these cases illustrates
that the victims, including the victim of a sexual assault, a
commercial creditor cheated out of payment, and an
aggrieved mother, confronted a fraudulent conveyance
that was intended to hinder, delay or defraud the plaintiff
out of payment of a just liability. 18

II. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACTION AND
ENFORCEMENT ACCRUE EXPENSE AND EFFORT AND
REQUIRE SKILL
Cardinale v. Miller shoulders attorney's fees upon
each party in a fraudulent conveyance action. 19 Given the
proclivity of the debtor to hide and conceal assets, the
creditor must take pro-active steps to lock down the assets,
lest the debtor launders the property through a bona fide
sale or loan transactions that is called "safe harbor." 20 To
insure that the conveyee will not dispose of the property
pending the outcome of the UVTA, the creditor can record
a lis pendens. 21 The creditor can attach the fraudulently
conveyed property. 22 The creditor can execute upon the
Fraudulent cases abound in bankruptcy court. In re High
Strength Steel Inc., 269 B.R. 560 (USBC, D. De, 2001) (discussing
the right of receivable owed by related party); In re Bernard, 96
F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing cashing out account in the
face of attachment); In re Wilbur, 211 B.R. 98, 104 (USBC, M.D.
Fla, 1997) (stating that post judgment, debtor converts accounts
into cashier's check); In re Schafer, 294 B.R. 126, 128 (USDC, ND,
CA 2003) (discussing changing banks in the face of attachment);
See Bankruptcy Code Sections 548 and 544(b) (discussing
incorporating state remedies under the UVTA seq.).
19 Cardinale v. Miller, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 550 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014).
20 "Thus, a showing of good faith and reasonably equivalent
value is all that is required to defeat a creditor's action based on
Civil Code section 3439.04, subdivision (a)." Annod Corp. v.
Hamilton & Samuels, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 924, 929 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
21 "We believe that this broad language [of the UFTA] allows a lis
pendens remedy." Kirkeby v. Super. Ct. of Orange Cty., 93 P.3d
395, 401 (Cal. 2004).
22 Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.07(a)(2) (West).
18
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fraudulently conveyed property. 23 In response, the third
party (i.e., the conveyee) can file a third party claim which,
as in Whitehouse v. Six Corp., compels the creditor to prove
up a fraudulent conveyance. 24 To obtain information to
prosecute a fraudulent conveyance claim, the creditor
would proceed with an examination of the debtor and
even compel production of records. 25 Judgment debtors
are less than forthcoming at a debtor's examination. 26
Fraudulent conveyances are built on circumstantial
evidence based on a conveyance with the intent to hinder,
delay, and defraud. 27 All of this legal activity accrues
attorney's fees and expenses including experts. 28
A creditor can enforce a judgment upon entry. 29 A
judgment creditor must pre-pay the sheriff in order for the
sheriff to enforce the judgment under a writ of execution. 30
The creditor must identify the property and location of the
property in the sheriff's instructions. 31 While the sheriff is a
law enforcement officer, the sheriff is not a detective and
Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.07(c) (West).
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 720.360 (West) [Burden of proof].
25 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 708.110(a) and 708.130 (West).
"Generally, there is no opportunity for discovery." Whitehouse v.
Six Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
26 "And the sanctity of the oath, by itself, does not ensure that all
judgment debtors will be completely forthcoming during a
judgment debtor examination." Jogani v. Jogani, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d
792, 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
27 Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(b) (badges of fraud); Neumeyer v.
Crown Funding Corp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976), overturned due to legislative action on other grounds (stating
fraudulent conveyance cases based on fraud are supported by
circumstantial evidence).
28 Mehrtash v. Mehrtash, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802, 805 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (describing necessity to prove "leviable interest in real
property through an appraisal of the real property”). Court
cannot judicial notice of appraisal from Zillow. In re Marriage of
Trejo, No. E054775, 2013 WL 1779606, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
26, 2013).
29 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 683.010 (West).
30 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 683.100(a)(1) (West) (sufficient deposit
sheriff to pay the costs of enforcement).
31 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 687.010(a) (West) (adequate description
of any property to be levied upon).
23
24
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has no obligation to ferret out assets. 32 Upon entry of a
judgment, the debtor is still free to dispose of assets, but
the judgment creditor can impose a lien on the judgment
debtor's assets. 33 The creditor is entitled to a turnover
order at the conclusion of an examination of the debtor or
third party. 34 These remedies enable a creditor to reach all
property of the debtor but only if the creditor seeks to
Enforcement is statutory. 36
initiate enforcement. 35
However, a court can order extraordinary relief in the
preservation of property or order the sheriff to take
exceptional steps. 37
Given the financial burden of the creditor to
enforce the judgment, and the complexity and expense of
legal process to recover a fraudulent conveyance or any
other asset, the debtor is motivated to hide, conceal, or
secret assets solely for the purpose of increasing the
creditor's absolute expense. Without a description of the
assets in the sheriff's instructions, the sheriff will not
enforce a judgment.
In the event of a fraudulent
conveyance, the creditor must "lock down" the property
and therefore plead and prove a fraudulent conveyance by
a preponderance of the evidence. Absent affirmative
action by the creditor, and subject to the distraint, if at all,
arising from any liens, the debtor is free to sell, dispose

The sheriff follows the written instructions of the creditor. Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 687.010(b) (West).
33 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 697.340 (West) (regarding real property);
id. § 697.530 (allows filing of JL-1, which is similar to a UCC, to
encumber certain personal property); id. §§ 708.110(d), 708.120(c)
( allowing liens on personal property of the debtor and lien on
personal property of the debtor in the hands of the third party),
among other liens.
34 Id. §§ 708.180, 708.205(a); Id. § 699.040 (describing a turnover
order).
35 Id. § 695.010(a) (stating that all property of a judgment is
subject to enforcement, unless declared immune or exempt).
36 Imperial Bank v. Pim Electric, Inc. 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 432 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
37 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 699.070(a) (West) (stating a court may
issue extraordinary relief as circumstances might warrant).
32
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transfer or liquidate any assets. 38 Consider the judgment,
absent enforcement, in a state of stasis and subject to
renewal. 39
Given this expense and effort, and burden befalling
upon the creditor to prove a fraudulent conveyance, the
debtor has every motive in the world to hide, conceal or
secret assets. 40 A conveyance, even if fraudulent, is still a
valid conveyance between the parties. 41 The purpose of a
fraudulent conveyance is to hinder, delay, and defraud the
creditor that deters the creditor from enforcement the
judgment itself by concealing accessible assets. 42

III. THE UNIVERSAL EQUATION OF IMMUNITY FROM
ENFORCEMENT
Compelled to finance enforcement, much less a
fraudulent conveyance action and its inherent burden of
proof, the conundrum for the creditor and counsel is
weighing the likelihood of success. This test is more than a
legal analysis of the UVTA and related claims, but rather

The UVTA enables a creditor to set aside a conveyance. Id. §
3439.07(a) (stating that a "creditor" has standing).
39 Id. § 683.020.
40 Fraudulent conveyance is potential a nondischargeable debt.
Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1581 (2016). A
fraudulent conveyance within one year of the bankruptcy might
bar the entire discharge. Bernard, 96 F.3d at 1279; see also, Cal.
Bankr. Code § 727(a)(2)(A) (West).
41 "As Annod points out, a fraudulent conveyance is void as
against the transferor's creditors and title remains in the
transferor as if no conveyance had been attempted." Annod
Corp. v. Hamilton & Samuels, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 924, 934 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002). (emphasis added); see also, Slater v. Bielsky, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 683, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960). Absent timely action, the
conveyance becomes immune from enforcement under the
UVTA statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3439.09(a)-(c)
(West) (setting the statute of limitations and statute of repose at 7
years).
42 Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1587 (holding that fraudulent conveyance
as concealment).
38
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an analytical analysis of the financial return to the client
after expending time, effort, and most important, money. 43
The test is to predict of efficiency of the asset
protection scheme. For example, if the debtor successfully
hid all assets that renders the assets immune from any
enforcement, the efficiency of the asset protection scheme
is 100%, or even greater, if the creditor expended money,
no matter the cost and whether the outcome was
unsuccessful. From these facts, the asset is 0% accessible to
the creditor. If, on the other hand, the asset protection
scheme immediately failed, and without any expense, the
asset fell into the lap of the creditor, the efficiency of the
asset protection is 0%, or flipped around, the asset was
100% accessible.
By framing a fraudulent conveyance as an act of
concealment, Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz
casts assets as inaccessible because these assets are
concealed and therefore unavailable to the creditor, absent
a fraudulent conveyance action or enforcement. When and
if the creditor reaches the "concealed assets," as framed by
Husky, the asset, in the hand of the creditor, is "accessible."
What moves the asset from inaccessibility to accessibility,
or not at all, involves an anagram of hard and soft factors,
as follows: the hard factor is the dollar value of the
concealed asset that has been found or targeted and
therefore subject to some type of enforcement, whether
successful or not; and second, the burden of the
enforcement. The next hard factor is the "burden." The
burden means the legal fees, court costs, expert fees, and
soft costs (overnight charges, title reports, appraisals etc.)
necessarily expended to prosecute the fraudulent
conveyance action or enforcement proceeding. Add to the
burden the lost opportunity costs, given that the creditor
will advance funds and forego another investment
opportunity for the funds. Consider the burden an
These claims include UVTA, resulting trust theories (no
conveyance was made), common law fraudulent conveyances,
unlawful corporate distributions under California Corporations
Code § 316(a), 506(b), and 2009(b), violation of the Bulk Sales Act
(Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code), and breach of
fiduciary duty if an improper corporate distribution.

43
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element of legal "energy" or "work" that is expended to
reach an accessible asset, if possible. The soft factors,
which are difficult, but not impossible, to calculate, are the
skills of the attorneys (on both sides of the equation), the
devotion of each attorney to the case at hand, the
availability of capital to prosecute or defend a case, the
reputations of the attorneys, the personal and professional
risks assumed in reaching property from the grip of an
unstable person, the disposition of the particular judge,
and the particular body of law (pro debtor or pro-creditor).
The factors are incorporated into the attorney's fees that
are part of the burden and, therefore, calculable in part.
While bankruptcy would stop nearly all state court
fraudulent conveyance actions given that the trustee is the
owner of the claims, bankruptcy is generally irrelevant
because the trustee subsumes the position of the creditor. 44
Here is the equation that measures the fraudulent
conveyance. Under Husky, the court frames a fraudulent
conveyance as a tool of concealment. 45 The converse is
that the legal action is to reach the fraudulent conveyed
property, now reframed as inaccessible, and thereby lift
the veil of the concealment. The fraudulent conveyance
action filed by the creditor attacks an asset subject to
concealment, reveals its existence as property of the
debtor, and makes it accessible to enforcement. 46
The denominator is the total of the claim, i.e.,
$1,000,000.00. 47 The numerator is the following: the dollar
value of the recovered asset minus the burden equals the
net recovery. This is what the equation looks like:
1- Total Cash Recovery-Total Burden =Net due the Client ÷
Total Dollar value of the Claim= Inaccessibility rate @(%).
Cal. Bankr. Code §§ 548, 544(b) (West) (stating trustee stands
in shoes of creditors).
45 Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1587 (describing fraudulent conveyance as
concealment).
46 Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.07(a)(1) (West) (describes avoiding the
transfer of obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the
creditor's claim).
47 The hypothetical is that the judgment is in the amount of
$1,000,000. The accrual of interest is irrelevant for these
calculations, but when factored in, would necessarily alter the
outcome on an incremental basis.
44
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#1.
If the claim is $1,000,000, the cash recovery
is $252,000, the fees are $151,000.00, the inaccessibility
efficiency of the asset protection scheme is 89.9% and the
accessibility efficiency is 10.1%.
#2.
If the claim is $1,000,000, and the cash
recovery is $1,000,000, but the burden is $500,000, the
inaccessibility efficiency is 50%, even though the creditor
collected 100% on the dollar.
#3.
If the claim is $632,000, and the cash
recovery is $185,000, but the burden is $100,000.00, the
inaccessibility efficiency is 86.6%. 48
#4.
What if the creditor spent more money that
the amount of the gross collection? The claim is
$1,000,000.00. The creditor collected $353,000, but spent
$500,000.00. The inaccessibility efficiency is 114.7% or
14.7% above 100%, which means that the asset protection
further damaged the creditor by increasing the creditor's
net loss.
#5.
Sometimes the debtor succeeds under Husky
in concealing all assets that leaves the creditor penniless,
even for costs. The claim is $1,000,000. The recovery due
the creditor is zero, but the creditor spent $500,000.00. The
inaccessibility efficiency rate is 150%, or increasing the
creditor's damages by another $500,000.
#6.
What if the creditor spent just $1,000 to
collection $1,000,000? The inaccessibility efficiency is .01%
and the accessibility efficiency is 99.9%.
The equation establishes a realistic market pricing
for any civil judgment. For example, take hypothetical #6
that sounds like an attorney writing up the payoff of the
judgment that the judgment debtor or insurance company
will pay. The market value of the judgment in #6 is 99.9%
or par. 49 For another example, take hypothetical #5. This is
To be really exact the inaccessibility efficiency is 86.55363912%.
The accessibility efficiency is 13.449367088%
49 Par means the face amount of the judgment that includes the
principal damages, pre-judgment interest under the California
Civil Code § 3287 (West) ( describing the right to pre-judgment
interest if the amount is fixed] or § 3289(a) (describing the
interest on contract debt), court costs and potentially prejudgment attorney's fees, if any. Wisper Corp. v. California
48
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a judgment, which is cloaked under the veil of asset
protection. The market value of the judgment in #5 is a
negative $500,000.00, i.e. toxic value.
This equation proves that, at a given time the
market value of judgment appreciates, or depreciates,
based on the total recovered less the burden and divided
by the total. However, should the creditor later discover
the hidden "treasure map" that reveals the debtor's secret
bank account, or box of gold doubloons, the probable
recovery skyrockets accompanied by an increase, or maybe
decrease, in costs to collect the judgment itself. Given that
enforcement is linear (i.e., from event to another event),
and that the debtor might dance around each act of
enforcement, this equation can predict the future value. If
the debtor ramps up an asset protection campaign by
opening the closing bank accounts, or cashing out bank
accounts, the response by the creditor is to levy every bank
in town, and likewise serve a subpoena on every bank. 50
Unstated, but part of the equation, is the fact that
the debtor might be incurring attorney's fees in fending off
enforcement. The equivocation in this sentence is not by
happenstance. The fact that the debtor files papers with
the sheriff or court in pro per, while the creditor has to pay
for an attorney to likewise file papers with the sheriff or
the court, is part and parcel of all asset protection which is
to bleed the other party to death. The more polite
language is a "war of attrition," which should not be
understated. A famous New Yorker cartoon stated "You
have a pretty good case, Mr. Pitkin. How much justice can
you afford?" 51 The wonderful expression applies to both
parties, but the judgment debtor needs not to retain an
attorney to exchange in penny-ante tricks, including
Commerce Bank, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(describing entitlement to prejudgment interest).
50 $40.00 for the sheriff's fee per bank; $100.00 for the process
server to serve the levy; and $100.00 to serve the subpoena for
each bank for a total of about $240 per package. Given 10 banks
in town, the total burden is $2,400.00 to reach all banks to serve
the levy and subpoena, plus paying for the subpoena charges
incurred by the bank.
51 Cartoon by J.B. Handelsman. Copyrighted The New Yorker
Collection, 1973.
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moving funds from bank to bank or opening bank
accounts in the name of newly minted LLC's which are
domestic, out-of- state, or even offshore. The debtor need
not spend too much money in depositing cash into the
bank account of a related entity that provides unrestricted
access to the debtor. With little or virtually no effort, the
debtor can: transfer title in real property to family
members; record false and fraudulent mortgages, deeds of
trust and financial statements; create promissory notes and
bogus contracts that would make the debtor look
insolvent; or establish "trusts" that warehouse all assets.
While the debtor might fill out the asset protection forms
or hire an attorney, the burden on the debtor is a trifle
when compared to the time, effort, and energy of the
creditor and attorney, given that the burden of proof falls
upon the creditor to prove a fraudulent conveyance. 52
Should the creditor engage in a relentless and
highly aggressive campaign to collect a judgment, a
judgment debtor might raise the white flag of surrender
and offer a cash settlement that be the 100% of the
judgment or a cash settlement. This equation still applies,
because the debtor would not have settled unless the
creditor had expended a lot money, time, and resources to
bring the debtor to the bargaining table.

IV. PRICING THE JUDGMENT PRICES THE
SETTLEMENT
Everything has a price including civil judgments.
Absent judgment for the recovery of personal property,
consent decrees, or injunctive relief; nearly all judgments
award money damages to the plaintiff for a precise and
specified sum of money. 53 All judgments accrue interest
that range from less than 1% for federal judgment to about
10% in most states. 54 Given the accrual of interest, and the
Whitehouse v. Six Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 604 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
53 "In any judgment, or execution upon such judgment, the
amount shall be computed and stated in dollars and cents,
rejecting fractions." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 577.5 (West).
54 Id. § 685.010(a) (listing 10% for California).
52
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statutory right to recover post-judgment attorney's fees
and costs, the debtor is motivated to pay off the judgment
in order to shrink the liability footprint. 55 This judgment,
given the absence of any burden and its appreciating
value, is priced at 100% or even more should the debtor
"dally," which enables the creditor to collect accrued
interest. A delay in payment penalizes the solvent debtor
given the accrual of interest in state court but not federal
court. 56
On the other hand, the debtor is recalcitrant. 57
Recalcitrance causes the creditor to accrue fees and costs
which resets the price of the judgment. Take the example
of the $632,000 civil judgment that produces a net return of
$85,000.00. The market price of the judgment is 13.4% of its
face value. 58 What does 13.4% really mean? The equation
that the defendant successfully shrunk the liability
footprint by 86.6%, even though losing the original [tort]
case at the jury trial. This victory replicates a jury award
for $85,000 when in fact the damages equaled $632,000.00.
Better stated, the 13.4% price recalibration of the judgment
is a repudiation of the original jury award. Granted that a
judgment for $85,000 is an affront to the plaintiff, much
less to the court itself, but the inaccessibility at 86.6% of
enforcement resets the price of the judgment.
This equation accurately monetizes the efforts of a
debtor to frustrate the efforts of a creditor in seeking to
enforce a judgment in the face of robust asset protection
strategies. Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz resets
the price of every judgment. Asset protection renders
inaccessible the debtor's assets that shrink to a finite
number the debtor's liability under the civil judgment of
this equation. Alternatively, a robust campaign, wellId. § 685.040 (enables the creditor to collect post-judgment
attorney's fee if the judgment allows fees as a line item).
56 The daily rate of interest for $1,000,000 is $273.97 in state court,
and $16.44 in federal court.
57 Family law courts are common forums for fraudulent
conveyances. See In re Marriage of Dick, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) (optimizes offshore asset protection schemes).
The family law court awards attorney's fees. Id. at 168 (granting
$750,000-in part related to asset protection).
58 This number is rounded to the nearest 10th of a decimal point.
55
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financed and with competent representation, alters the
pricing of the judgment, which would, of course, expand,
or even exceed, the debtor's true liability footprint under
the original judgment. 59 This equation prices to the
judgment all "price points" up and down this asset
protection continuum. The efforts to hide, and the efforts
to seek, assets are now calculated to 7th decimal point,
which includes, for example, the net payment of
$84,999.999691 due the creditor based on the $632,000
judgment. 60
Pricing through this equation is more than just
quantifying the success or failure of asset protection
campaign. The pricing of judgment through this equation
takes center stage in the medium of settlement, whether by
direct contact, a judicially mandated settlement conference,
or mediation, when the parties have a good idea in pricing
the potential judgment at par. After years of litigation, and
rounds of discovery, chances are that the parties can
reasonably predict the outcome of the case. Clearly,
parties and their attorneys are sometimes surprised, but
generally experienced attorneys have a good grip on the
final "price" of the judgment. Absent a fully insured
defendant for the costs of defense and indemnity, or a very
solvent defendant, the equation becomes part of, if not
overwhelms, all dispute resolutions. Nothing is more
important than getting paid and paid without further
litigation, expensive enforcement or toppling asset
protection schemes. This imperative drives all settlements
and the respective strategies of the warring parties that
reveal themselves in settlement "Technicolor."
The
erstwhile defendant boasts that the plaintiff never collects
come "hell or high water" or, alternatively, the plaintiff
If the creditor collected interest, costs and attorney's fees, and
tort damages that arise out of the fraudulent conveyance action,
the price of the original judgment would exceed its par value. A
creditor can recover damages arising from a fraudulent
conveyance and even punitive damages. Cardinale v. Miller, 166
Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (granting
compensatory damages of $2,170,593; punitive damages of
$900,000; and $293,937.50 in attorneys' fees). The accessibility
quotient might exceed 100%.
60 Based on hypothetical #3.
59
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threatens that "no stone shall be unturned." 61 Based on the
risk of nonpayment of a settlement and applying this
equation, the plaintiff's counsel is instructed to: demand
security to insure performance under a payment program
given the risk of a later asset protection or debtor fatigue;
agree to accept a cash sum to avoid the risk of the preordained default under the payment program; or demand
and receive a personal guaranty from a solvent party. 62
Other settlement options abound.
Whatever the charges or counter charges in the
medium of a settlement, the parties and their attorneys
apply this equation to reach, if possible, a number that
fairly reflect the true price of the judgment and settle the
case accordingly.

Hooser v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000).
62 Debtor fatigue means that the debtor defaults because the
debtor decides that "enough money has been paid." This term is
common in Chapter 13s.
61

